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The South Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Alford' con-
fronted the issue of the admissibility of evidence of a prior diffi-
culty between the accused and a third person. The trial judge had
permitted the State, over the defendant's objection, to introduce
evidence of threats made by the accused against the brother of
the deceased and against another third party made one week
prior to the homicide.2 Additionally, the testimony of two wit-
nesses was allowed, over the defendant's objection, which quoted
the accused just two hours prior to the fatal shooting as saying
that he was going to get Lester Cox, the brother of the deceased,
with either a knife or a pistol and that "that young man would
die tonight."' 3 The prosecution's intent in seeking admission of
this evidence was to show that the defendant had possessed the
necessary malice aforethought in the resulting homicide.4
The admission of this evidence was raised on appeal, and the
supreme court found that "[w]hile it is true that threats against
a third party are normally not admitted to show malice against
the deceased, the rule is not an inflexible one."5 The court quoted
the discussion in Corpus Juris Secundum as authority, noting
that:
[e]vidence is inadmissible to show a difficulty between the
accused and a third person in no way connected with the victim
or offense .... However, where there [sic] connection with the
1. 264 S.C. 26, 212 S.E.2d 252 (1975).
2. One week prior to the homicide, appellant, and Lester, the brother of the deceased,
along with one David McDowell were riding together in Lester's truck. When the appel-
lant persisted in driving recklessly over the protests of Lester, the latter cut off the ignition
and, taking the keys, demanded that appellant move from behind the wheel. When appel-
lant refused, Lester struck him, at which point the appellant warned Lester that he would
"get him." Subsequently, inside a nearby coffee shop, the appellant pulled a knife on
Lester in the presence of the owner. As the appellant was leaving the shop, he called out
to Lester to "take me to Gene Ray's [the owner of the pistol used by the appellant in the
fatal shooting] and it will be all over with tonight." Id. at 32, 212 S.E.2d at 254.
3. Record at 36 & 43. These comments by the accused appear not to have been
communicated directly to Lester Cox, but apparently had been communicated to Albert
prior to the fatal shooting. Id. at 39-40.
4. Brief for Respondent at 6. Notwithstanding the admission of the disputed evi-
dence at trial, the jury was unwilling to convict on the charge of murder, returning instead
the verdict of manslaughter. Record at 2.
5. 264 S.C. at 32, 212 S.E.2d at 254.
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offense sufficiently appears, evidence of prior difficulties be-
tween the accused and a third person is admissible to show
malice, premeditation, or general state of mind, as is evidence
of accused's ill will toward a member of the family of deceased,
or that accused had a grudge against the companion of the vic-
tim at the time of the assault. . . .40 C.J.S. Homicide § 209.
Without elaborating, the court added that "the series of
events recited . . . sufficiently connects the threats with the of-
fense so as to evidence malice. . ." and concluded that "both the
threats of the previous week and the threats of the same night
were admissible in evidence." 7 Although unarticulated, the
court's conclusion must have necessarily centered upon three sali-
ent determinations: (1) the relationship between the third person
and the victim or the affinity of the third person to the offense;
(2) the proximity of the antecedent threats or conduct to the
offense; and (3) the degree of malice established by virtue of the
antecedent conduct.8 The failure of the court to articulate the
guiding standards to be employed will undoubtedly result in
future confusion as to the admissibility of particular testimony.
More importantly, the conspicuous absence of the proper analy-
sis may create the belief that the rule of admitting third party
6. Id. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 190 & n.45 (2d ed. 1954) [hereinafter cited as
McCORMICK]; 1 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 163 (13th ed. 1972) [hereinafer cited
as WHARTON]; 1 & 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 105, 363, 364 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter
cited as WIGNIORE].
7. 264 S.C. at 33, 212 S.E.2d at 254. Since the conclusion of the court on this issue
rests largely upon the particular facts involved, a capsule of the events is necessary. At
about midnight on the evening in question, the appellant and his now acquitted co-
defendant, Glen Lane, and the deceased Albert Cox were drinking. An argument ensued,
culminating in a fist fight betwzen Lane and Albert, in which the former dominated. Later
that evening the two again met. This time Albert had returned with his brother Lester,
and Lane and the appellant had procured a pistol from the appellant's brother, Gene Ray.
Although the evidence relative to what then took place is in conflict, essentially Lane
engaged Lester (the deceased's brother) in a fist fight. The appellant, however, fired the
pistol, shooting Albert Cox and fatally wounding him. Id. at 30-31, 212 S.E.2d at 253.
8. Even as early as 1901, the United States Supreme Court had noted the need for
the latter two determinations:1
But even if it be conceded that prior conduct of the accused may be put in
evidence in order to show that he had feelings of enmity towards the deceased,
we are clear that the testimony was wrongfully admitted in the present case,
because the time of the incident testified to, more than a month before the
homicide, was too remote, and because the incident itself did not tend to prove
any feeling of enmity on the part of [the defendant] to the deceased.
Bird v. United States, 180 U.S. 356, 360 (1901). The additional requirement of the connec-
tion between the third party and the offense is logically a product of the variation encoun-
tered when the defendant threatens not the deceased but some other person.
2
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threats is so firmly established in this jurisdiction that its appli-
cation warrants only nominal consideration.
Concededly, the theoretical niceties of the law of evidence
that loom large in academic minds are less significant to the
attorney attempting to secure the admission of evidence into
court. This is amply demonstrated in the instant case, where an
argument equal to the one made for the admissibility of the week-
old threat could be made for its exclusion. The exclusion argu-
ment would contend that since malice could have been demon-
strated sufficiently9 by the threat two hours prior to the shooting,
the use of the week-old threat would be cumulative. Recognizing
the "prejudicial" nature of this latter evidence, due to its remote-
ness and uncertain probative value, exclusion seems only pro-
per.10 Thus for all practical purposes, where the result of either
exclusion or admission could be reached, the understandable re-
sponse of a trial judge would be to admit the disputed evidence
conditionally," knowing that even if its introduction was subse-
quently held to be error, the prejudice which resulted from its
admission would in many instances be found not so substantial
in nature as to warrant a reversal.
Also illustrative of this latter point is the lack of treatment
the supreme court gave to the trial court's apparent error in per-
mitting the introduction of evidence of the accused's threats
against David McDowell as evincing the difficulty between the
accused and Lester Cox occurring the week prior to the homi-
cide.'2 Dissenting, Justice Bussey astutely observed that:
9. But see note 4, supra.
10. The conclusions of one commentator support such an approach:
It is suggested that such evidence be ruled inadmissible unless it can be shown
by the prosecution that it is essential to the proof of an element of the crime
allegedly committed by the accused and, indeed, that its use in this sense not
be merely cumulative. This rule of necessity has been adopted or hinted at
before in the authorities. It admittedly involves some degree of judicial discre-
tion . ..
Payne, The Law Whose Life Is Not Logic: Evidence of Other Crimes in Criminal Cases, 3
U. RIcH. L. REv. 62, 86-87 (1968). Accord, e.g., State v. Goebel, 36 Wash. 2d 367, 379, 218
P.2d 300, 306 (1950) ("this class of evidence, where not essential to the establishment of
the state's case should not be admitted, even though falling within the generally recog-
nized exceptions to the rule of exclusion, when the trial court is convinced that its effect
would be to generate heat instead of diffusing light, or ...where the minute peg of
relevancy will be entirely obscured by the dirty linen hung on it.") See also McCOnMICK
§ 157; 2 J. WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENc E 404[10] (1975).
11. Record at 33, 37, 39-40, 101-03.
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As McDowell was not involved in or connected with the alterca-
tion or confrontation which resulted in the homicide, evidence
as to threats allegedly made by appellant against McDowell was
totally irrelevant to any issue in the case, highly prejudicial and,
of course, the admission thereof was erroneous.' 3
Nevertheless, the majority's silence on this issue should probably
be viewed as amounting to a holding that the error was in fact
not prejudicial."
In deciding that it was permissible to show the prior diffi-
culty between the accused and the brother of the deceased, the
supreme court declared that the rule set forth in State v.
Clinkscales, 1s prohibiting testimony as to the general details of a
previous difficulty, had not been violated."5 Although the rule
had been enunciated as "well settled" in a number of prior
cases, 7 none of those cases offered much guidance as to its proper
application. The rule has therefore been literally applied in some
instances to deny the admission of any details of the prior dis-
pute."8 In other cases, its application was tempered to exclude
only those prejudicial and irrelevant details. 9 Additionally, the
13. 264 S.C. 26, 36, 212 S.E.2d 252, 256 (Bussey, J., dissenting).
It was probably the state's contention that the threats made against McDowell were
also sufficiently connected to show malice on the part of defendant. Brief for Respondents
at 10. But see discussion at note 14 infra.
14. The only other interpretation would be that the court regarded the threats against
McDowell as "sufficiently connected". Yet a careful reading of the language seems not
to be so encompassing. Indeed if such were the case, the quote from C.J.S. (see text
accompanying note 6 infra) appears woefully inadequate.
15. 231 S.C. 650, 99 S.E.2d 663 (1957).
16. 264 S.C. at 33, 212 S.E.2d at 254.
17. See, e.g., State v. Bush, 211 S.C. 455, 45 S.E.2d 847 (1947); State v. Smith, 200
S.C. 188, 20 S.E.2d 726 (1941); State v. Kennedy, 143 S.C. 318, 141 S.E. 559 (1927); State
v. Abercrombie, 130 S.C. 358, 126 S.E. 142 (1924); State v. Evans, 112 S.C. 43, 99 S.E.
751 (1919); State v. Adams, 68 S.C. 431, 47 S.E. 676 (1903).
18. E.g., State v. Kennedy, 143 S.C. 318, 141 S.E. 559 (1927); State v. Evans, 112
S.C. 43, 99 S.E. 751 (1919); State v. Adams, 68 S.C. 421, 47 S.E. 676 (1903).
19. The court in State v. Abercrombie, 130 S.C. 358, 126 S.E. 142 (1924), held that
evidence as to the defendant's prior threat upon the deceased's life was admissible, but
that evidence of the defendant's ransacking the deceased's house and verbally abusing the
deceased's wife during this encounter was prejudicial and irrelevant to the issue of guilt
and thus inadmissible. Id. at 363-64, 126 S.E. at 143. Similarly in State v. Bush, 211 S.C.
455, 45 S.E.2d 847 (1947), the court admitted testimony of the defendant's numerous
threats against his wife in defendant's trial for the homicide of his brother-in-law who at
the time of the threats was protecting her. However, the court disallowed the introduction
of the details of episodes of physical violence by the defendant against his wife as being
irrelevant and highly prejudicial to the issue of guilt in his brother-in-law's murder. Id.
at 460-61, 45 S.E.2d at 849.
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol28/iss3/7
1976] EVIDENCE
rule has been held applicable in varying degrees to testimony
offered by the defendant."
The correct application of the rule prohibiting details of pre-
vious difficulties should easily follow from proper recognition of
its supporting considerations-that it is improper to go into the
details of a previous difficulty to an extent which will confuse the
issues and prejudice the defendant by trying the merits of the
prior incident. Thus while evidence of ill feelings, malice, and
threats is properly admissible for the purpose of explaining what
occurred and for the purpose of aiding the jury in its determina-
tion of the ultimate issue, it is not properly admissible for the
purpose of obscuring the issue or substituting a false one., Neces-
sarily then, rules which proscribe the admissibility of evidence of
a defendant's threat against a third party, or which limit the
admissible details of such prior conduct, must be kept flexible
by judicial discretion where it appears that the trial court's ulti-
mate fact-finding will be sufficiently advanced."
In this light, it may be said that the South Carolina Supreme
Court correctly concluded in Alford that there was no error in the
trial judge's ruling.
20. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 200 S.C. 188, 200, 20 S.E.2d 726 (1941). The application
of the rule to defendants has been less than uniform. In the earlier case of State v.
Kennedy, 143 S.C. 318, 141 S.E. 559 (1927), the defendant alleged error in the admission
of certain details by the state of a prior difficulty. The court disagreed, commenting that
it was the defendant who first elicited testimony as to the details in an attempt to imply
that he was not the wrongdoer. In such a situation, it was the court's opinion that the
State was properly permitted to combat the defendant's theory by eliciting testimony
along the same lines. Id. at 322, 141 S.E. at 560. But, in the more recent case of State v.
Peterson, 255 S.C. 579, 180 S.E.2d 341 (1971) it was the defendant who attempted to
introduce the details of a previous difficulty. However, the trial judge excluded most of
the details. The court found no error, noting that,
[t]he trial judge liberally applied the evidentiary rule here in question, thereby
granting the appellant [defendant] more latitude in the introduction of evi-
dence regarding the matter of previous difficulties between himself and the
details thereof. . ., than he was entitled to under the rule.
Id. at 583, 180 S.E.2d 343.
21. The following from State v. Adams, 68 S.C. 421, 47 S.E. 676 (1904) reflects this
view:
The evidence as to previous difficulty was competent only to show the animus
of the parties, and thus aid the jury in reaching a conclusion as to who was
probably the aggressor, and what demeanor each party had reason to expect
from the other when they met and the fatal difficulty occurred. The general
details of the previous trouble were properly excluded.
Id. at 425, 47 S.E. at 677.
22. See note 10 supra.
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I. IMPEACHMENT: PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT
A. Foundation and Notice
The South Carolina Supreme Court in State v. Galloway23
considered two issues which are noteworthy. The first involves the
requisite notice of "laying the foundation" before contradicting
a witness on a prior inconsistent statement. In addition to the
familiar "when, where, and to whom" rule," the appellants as-
serted that a witness must be warned of the cross-examiner's
intention to impeach in the event the statement is denied.25 Char-
acterizing this rule as a rather "prevalent trial superstition,"'26 the
court found it not be be the law. Indeed, the appellant's conten-
tion had been raised before and expressly repudiated by the 1881
decision of State v. White.27 The Galloway court could find no
more substantial basis for the myth other than a statement in
State v. Brock2" noting that the solicitor in that case had cross-
examined the defendant as to a prior inconsistent statement
"after notifying the witness that he proposed to contradict
him. .... ",29 The decision in Galloway should now make it un-
23. 263 S.C. 585, 211 S.E.2d 885 (1975).
24. Professor Dreher lucidly explained "laying the foundation":
Before a prior inconsistent statement may be proved against a witness, he must
be asked about it on cross-examination and informed 'when, where, and to
whom' he was supposed to have made the statement.
DREHER, A GUIDE TO EVIDENCE LAW IN SoUTH CAROLINA 13-14 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as DREHER].
That the formula need not be blindly followed is well settled in South Carolina. It is
sufficient if the witness is fairly apprised of the circumstances under which it is claimed
he made the earlier statement. See, Elliott v. Black River Electric Co-op, 233 S.C. 233,
104 S.E.2d 357 (1958). The purpose of the requirement is to avoid unfair surprise to the
adversary and to save time, since an admission by the witness may make extrinsic proof
unnecessary. Indeed, by the majority view, such an admission will preclude receipt of the
prior statement into evidence. See generally DREHER 14; McCoRMICK § 159; accord,
McMillan v. Ridges, 229 S.C. 76, 91 S.E.2d 883 (1956). Contra, WIGMORE § 1037, n.4.
(Chadbourn Rev. 1976).
25. Brief for the Appellants at 16.
26. 263 S.C. at 591, 211 S.E.2d at 888.
27. 15 S.C. 281, 390 (1881). The court answered the contention thusly:
But we are not aware of any rule which requires that the witness should be
warned before he answers of the intention to contradict him, in case he denies
having made the statement which it is proposed to prove, in any other way than
the character of the preliminary questions as to the time when, the place where
and person to whom such contrary statement is alleged to have been made,
would be likely to do.
Id. at 382-93.
28. 130 S.C. 252, 126 S.E. 28 (1925).
29. Id. at 253, 126 S.E. at 28.
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equivocably clear that "[T]he requirement of notice is met
when the cross-examiner advises the witness of the substance of
the prior statement and the time when, the place where and the
person to whom it was made." 0
B. Collateral Matters
The second issue presented to the Galloway court spawned
a clarification of the test of "collateralness" and a subsequent
enlargement of the scope of suitable subject matter on which a
witness may be impeached. The rule that a cross-examiner is
concluded by the answer of a witness to a collateral question,
while elementary to the law of evidence,' remains, nevertheless,
difficult in its application. The difficulty, of course, lies with
determining what is collateral under the rule. As Dean Wigmore
observed,
[w]hen we seek to learn what 'collateral' means, we are obli-
gated either to define further-in which case it is a mere epithet,
not a legal test-or to illustrate by specific instances-in which
case we are left to the idiosyncrasies of individual opinion.2
The test for collateralness in South Carolina until now had
been articulated in the now familiar terms enunciated in State
v. Brock3 3 as being whether
the cross-examining party [would] be entitled to prove the fact
as a part of and as tending to establish, his case [.1 If he would
be allowed to do so, the matter is not collateral; but if he would
not be allowed to do so, it is collateral.
34
The court in Galloway, however, found, as some commentators
had, that this formulation was just too narrow to suffice for all
cases.
35
30. 263 S.C. at 591, 211 S.E.2d at 888.
31. State v. Brock, 130 S.C. 252, 126 S.E. 28 (1925) and cases cited therein. Also see,
State v. Miller, 262 S.C. 369, 204 S.E.2d 738 (1974); State v. Smith, 263 S.C. 150, 208
S.E.2d 533 (1974); State v. Williams, 263 S.C. 290, 210 S.E.2d 298 (1974), which are
surveyed in 27 S.C.L. REv. 467, 470 (1975). See generally, DREHER 14-15; MCCORMICK §
36; 3A WIGMORE §§ 1020-1023 (Chadbourn Rev. 1976).
32. 3A WIGMORE § 1020 (Chadbourn Rev. 1976).
33. 130 S.C. 252, 126 S.E. 28.
34. Id. at 254, 126 S.E. at 29.
35. 263 S.C. at 592, 211 S.E.2d at 888. Professor Dreher's astute criticism of this
formulation was that a strict application would relegate the right to impeach to that of
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In this case, defendant's witness, a Mrs. Church, had testi-
fied" that from her place of employment she had observed 300
yards away, a tall gray-haired man strike a tall young man with
what appeared to be a 2 x 4, and in addition that she had seen
the younger man respond by striking his assailant with his fists.
Although Mrs. Church did not recognize either man at the time,
she further testified that upon hearing a news broadcast of the
death of a Mr. Brissey she had then realized that the older man
she had seen was he. Only from a later newscast relating to the
arrest of the defendant did she learn that the younger man was
her sister's son, the defendant Galloway.
On cross-examination, the solicitor elicited from Mrs.
Church that prior to learning the identity of either of the antago-
nists, she had felt that the blow struck by the older man "was a
pretty bad thing to do." He then inquired of her whether or not
upon learning of Brissey's death, but before knowing of the in-
volvement of her nephew, she had exclaimed to three named co-
workers: "Why did they do away with capital punishment? He
was a good man."37
The judge, permitting the question over the defense's
objection, ruled that Mrs. Church's co-workers could be called
to contradict her denial of having made the statement." During
their testimony, the co-workers also testified to facts which, if
believed, made it most unlikely that Mrs. Church had made the
observations to which she testified.
To the supreme court it was apparent, upon examining the
record on appeal, that the "testimony [of Mrs. Church] sought
to be impugned [was] material, while the impugning testimony,
except for that purpose, [was] not." 9 Since testimony of such
a nature could not have been offered in proof of the case-in-chief
against the defendant, it would concededly be collateral under
the Brock formula." However, the supreme court found that the
decision, which Dean Wigmore felt was responsible for the Brock-
[t]he trial judge should have the . . . discretion, to relax this rule when it
appears that the fact testified to, no matter how minor, was one which the
witness could not have been mistaken about if his story was true.
DREHER 15.
36. 263 S.C. at 590, 211 S.E.2d at 887.
37. Id.
38. Record at 657, 671, 691.
39. 263 S.C. at 593, 211 S.E.2d at 889.
40. Although the state did not concede this point, the court made the decision for
them. 263 S.C. at 592, 211 S.E.2d at 888.
[Vol. 28
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type test, had enunciated a much broader standard. That deci-
sion, Attorney-General v. Hitchcock,4" had advanced the rule that
for a prior inconsistency to be deemed relevant and properly the
subject of impeachment
"[ilt must be connected with the issue as a matter capable of
being distinctly given in evidence, or it must be so far connected
with it as to be a matter which, if answered in a particular way,
would contradict a part of, the witness' testimony..."I'
Notably, the court's opinion does not overrule the Brock for-
mula for determining collateralness.1 Rather, it only intimates an
agreement with Dean Wigmore's view that such expressions of
the test, although "accurate enough as far as they go," neverthe-
less fail to provide for "an important class of . . . admissible
[evidence], namely facts relating to the bias, corruption, or
other specific deficiencies of the witness.""
In order to find a statement of the rule from our own jurisdic-
tion, which, in the court's words, is "broad enough to sustain the
allowance of the contradiction, 45 this passage from Smith v.
Henry," a case predating even Hitchcock was resurrected:
"The general rule is, that the answer of a witness, to an imma-
terial question, cannot be contradicted to impeach his credit;
but if tbe question is in any wise material to the issue, his
answer can be contradicted.
4 7
That this language is not employed as the new test for collateral-
ness is very apparent. Indeed, the phrase "in any wise material
to the issue" is no less a legal epithet than is "collateral."
41. 1 Exch. 99 (1847).
42. 263 S.C. at 592, 211 S.E.2d at 888, quoting Attorney-General v. Hitchcock, 1
Exch. 99 (1847) (emphasis added by court). See also 3A WIGMORE § 1020 (Chadbourn Rev.
1976).
43. The court only went so far as to recognize that the rule "would not suffice for all
cases." 263 S.C. at 592, 211 S.E.2d at 888.
44. 3A WIGMORE § 1020 (Chadbourn Rev. 1976). For an excellent treatment of this
view, see Ewing v. United States, 135 F.2d 633, 640-42 (1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 803
(1943).
45. 263 S.C. at 593, 211 S.E.2d at 888.
46. 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) 118 (1831).
47. 263 S.C. at 593, 211 S.E.2d at 888, quoting Smith v. Henry, 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.)
118, 127 (1831). Although this case has often been cited as authority for the proposition
that one may not impeach on collateral matters, e.g., State v. Wyse, 33 S.C. 582, 592, 12
S.E. 556, 558 (1890); State v. Sullivan, 43 S.C. 205, 210, 21 S.E. 4, 7 (1895); Miller, Adm'r
v. A.C.L.R. Co., 140 S.C. 123, 213, 138 S.E. 675, 705 (1926) (dissenting opinion), this
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In searching for a new legal standard by which to measure
the relevancy of this latter class of evidence, the court quoted the
following from a Kentucky decision:"8
"if a prior statement bears upon the story of a witness with such
force and directness as to give it appreciable value in determin-
ing whether or not that story is true, such statement may be
itroduced against him."'"
Perhaps one further comment regarding the viability of the
Brock test is appropriate. As previously noted, the Galloway
opinion does not overrule the test, but, rather, makes it clear that
the Brock test is no longer, if it ever was, the exclusive test for
governing the admissibility of impeaching evidence. Conse-
quently, the rule stated in Brock, can no longer be used to exclude
testimony as irrelevant and collateral, but is instead available
only to point out one clear area of impeaching testimony which
is admissible.
III. STATUTORY LIMITATION By FAILING TO DELIVER WRITTEN
STATEMENT
The decision in State v. Motes" is destined to be troublesome
for a number of reasons, one of which is the court's literal con-
struction of South Carolina Code sections 1-65, 26-7.1, and 26-
7.2.1 The supreme court construed these provisions so as to pre-
48. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 281 S.W.2d 891 (Ky. 1955).
49. 263 S.C. at 593, 211 S.E.2d at 888 quoting Commonwealth v. Jackson, 281 S.W.2d
891, 894-95 (Ky. 1953). Of course, a number of variations of this test exist. See, e.g., Ewing
v. United States, 135 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942):
But when it goes to challenge directly the truth of what the witness has said in
matters crucial or material to the issues on trial, by no process of reason can it
be held collateral.
Id. at 641; accord, DREHER 15, note 35 supra. Although the language quoted by the
Galloway court refers only to self-contradicting evidence, apparently the test would be
applicable to contradiction by extrinsic evidence as well, since the South Carolina Su-
preme Court has, thus far, never distinquished the two. See 3A WMORE §§ 1019, 1020,
1021 n.1 (Chadbourn Rev. 1976).
50. 264 S.C. 317, 215 S.E.2d 190 (1975).
51. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-65 (1962) provides:
Public employee taking statement in investigation to give copy.-Whenever
any person employed by the State, or any county, city or municipality thereof,
or any part of any such governing body, shall take a written statement in any
investigation of any kind or nature from any person, the person receiving or
taking the written statement shall give to the person making the statement a
copy thereof and shall obtain from the person making the statement a signed
receipt of the copy so delivered.
[Vol. 28
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elude the defense from introducing a prior written statement for
impeachment purposes because the State had originally failed to
furnish a copy of the statement to the witness when it was made,
as statutorily required.2
The issue was raised at the murder trial of James Motes,
where the State offered as a witness the wife of the accused.53 Mrs.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-7.1 (1962) provides:
Examination of witness in criminal proceeding concerning written statement
made to public employee.-No witness in any preliminary hearing or in any
criminal judicial proceeding of any kind or nature shall be examined or cross-
examined by any examiner, solicitor, lawyer or prosecuting officer concerning a
written statement formerly made and given to any person employed by this
State, or any county, city, or municipality thereof, or any part of any such
governing body, unless it first be shown that at the time of the making of the
statement the witness was given an exact copy of the statement, and that before
his examination or cross-examination the witness was given a copy of the state-
ment and allowed a reasonable time in which to read it.
S.C.CoDE ANN. § 2672 (1962) provides:
Admissibility of such statement in evidence.-Unless the provisions of §§ 1-65
and 26-7.1 have been complied with, no statement such as is referred to in those
sections shall be admissible in evidence in any case, nor shall any reference be
made to it in the trial of any case.
52. In the few cases the supreme court has been called upon to construe these sec-
tions, it has typically responded in a manner which would not exclude valuable evidence.
In State v. Anderson, 224 S.C. 419, 79 S.E.2d 455 (1954), the court emphasized the
statute's language which imposed the duty on the investigating officers with respect to
statements which they "shall take". Thus the court found the statute did not apply to
statements taken before its enactment. Id. at 421-22, 79 S.E.2d at 457.
Again avoiding the exclusion of evidence but in this instance by de-emphasizing the
statute's language, the court in State v. Jones, 228 S.C. 484, 91 S.E.2d 1 (1956) found that:
[r]easonably construed, the provision in Section 2 of the Act that the witness
be given a copy of the written statement at the time of the making of the
statement does not mean that such a copy must be given eo instante. The
requirement of the statute is satisfied if a copy of the statement be given within
a reasonable time after its making...
Id. at 493, 91 S.E.2d at 6.
The only other decision which brings some light to the subject is State v. Mikell, 257
S.C. 315, 185 S.E.2d 814 (1971) in which the court held that the statute was not applicable
to exclude tape recordings of an alleged conspiracy. Importantly, the court went on to note
that:
[olne of the purposes of this statute is to permit a witness or a defendant to
refresh his memory relative to statements made prior to the trial. Inasmuch as
the tapes were played to and for these defendants prior to the trial, it cannot
be forcefully argued that the spirit and purpose of the rule has been circum-
vented.
Id. at 326, 185 S.E.2d at 819.
53. Prior to being sworn as a witness, the defense interposed objection to Mrs. Motes'
competency as a witness and to the proposed subject matter of her testimony. Record at
21. The defense contended that under § 26-403 of the South Carolina Code, any commu-
nication, verbal or nonverbal, made during coverture is protected from disclosure in a
11
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Motes admitted in her testimony that she had made two prior
statements concerning the crime, one written and a subsequent
oral one, both made to the investigating officers. She testified,
out of the jury's presence, that her first statement was false54 but
that the oral one, consistent with her in-court testimony, was
true.5 The trial judge sua sponte refused to permit examination
or cross examination from the prior written statement when it
became apparent that she had not been given a copy."
The colloquy among the attorney for the State, attorney for
the defense, and the trial judge concerning the use of the prior
written statement revealed the judge's concern:
The COURT: You can ask her about any oral statement she
made but you can't face her with [the] written statement and
that's spelled out in the Code. And I've been through it. I saved
a man from the chair from that one time by using the rule.
The COURT: Unless the provisions of 1-65 ... and the provi-
sions of 26-7.1 have been complied with no statement such as
referred to in those sections shall be admissible in evidence in
any case nor shall any reference be made to it at the trial of the
case. How can it be any plainer, gentlemen . . . I've been
through this thing [before].
The COURT: It's a two edge sword. It was for the benefit of
the defendant in my case but it cuts both ways.5"
Nevertheless, the judge stated that he would be willing to relax
the rule somewhat and allow Mrs. Motes to be cross-examined as
to her testimony that one statement was true and the other false."
criminal case by one spouse against the other. That the trial judge overruled the objection
and the supreme court affirmed his decision, ruling that the privilege, as defined by the
statute, lies with the witnessing spouse and not the communicating spouse, is of course
another troubling aspect of this case. Record at 22-23; 264 S.C. at 323, 215 S.E.2d at 192-
93. This part of the decision is treated separately under the section dealing with Privileges.
See notes 77-91 and accompanying text infra.
54. Record at 29.
55. The oral statement was made to the Solicitor on the morning prior to trial. Id.
at 86, 90.
56. Record at 56.
57. Id. at 57-62.
58. Id. at 64. The defense did pursue this opening, but with little success.
(DEFENSE): What other inconsistencies in your statements other than those
two we have already pointed out about the shiny object and the man pulling
the gun out in the grill did you make ... [b]etween that and what you've
testified to from this witness stand under oath?
[Vol. 28
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This permission for limited cross-examination was viewed as
significant by the supreme court. Though they too construed the
applicable statutes to preclude the admission of the written state-
ment,5" the court speaking through Justice Lewis went on to hold
that:
[T]here [was] no showing that the inconsistencies between
the trial testimony and the prior statement were not limited to
those stated by the witness on cross-examination. Since the
witness admitted that she had made false and inconsistent
statements about the matter and the defendant was permitted
to examine her concerning these inconsistencies, the defendant
was not prejudiced by the refusal of the trial court to allow the
prior statement to be further used in the trial."0
The supreme court appears to have been unbothered by its
own inconsistency. That a trial judge may vacillate between a
strict and unwaivering interpretation of the code that "cuts both
ways" and an equitable and compromising position is excusable
by the exigencies of trial. The same cannot be said for a court of
review.
This ambivalent nature of the court's opinion is probably
best explained as a reflection of the concerns expressed in the
strong dissent of Justice Bussey. While agreeing with the majority
that in this particular case, no showing of prejudice was demon-
strated, Justice Bussey seriously questioned the court's construc-
tion of the three code sections:
I cannot conceive of the legislature having intended to deprive
an individual of the benefit of such evidence because of the
failure of the State to comply with the law. Such would, I think
be completely illogical and outside the obvious purpose of the
statutory scheme."
More importantly, the dissenting justice noted that had the
MRS. MOTES: Is that I didn't know that my husband had the gun when he
left to go back over there.
(DEFENSE): That's the only other thing?
MRS. MOTES: That's the only other thing.
Record at 87.
59. 264 S.C. at 325, 215 S.E.2d at 193.
60. Id., 215 S.E.2d at 193.
61. Id. at 327, 215 S.E.2d at 194. On this point the defendant asserted that such a
construction would be "an invitation to law enforcement agencies to defeat conclusively
any impeachment of their witnesses by the simple expedient of not receipting for witness
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constitutional question been raised, the case of Chambers v.
Mississippi"2 would clearly preclude such a construction.
In Chambers, the United States Supreme Court held that the
Due Process clause barred a state from making evidentiary rul-
ings which would render the trial fundamentally unfair. 3 After
Chambers it is clear that the right of cross-examination is not
merely "a desirable rule of trial procedure,"64 but rather it is a
right of constitutional proportions. Because it helps to assure the
accuracy of the truth determining process, a state may not rigidly
apply evidentiary rules to defeat its proper assertion.1
5
Although Chambers has been applied,6 in various ways by
62. 410 U.S. 286 (1973).
63. Leon Chambers, charged with the murder of a police officer, asserted as one
defense, the repeated confessions of one McDonald. Although McDonald was turned over
to the local authorities, he was ultimately released after repudiating a sworn confession
at his preliminary hearing. At trial, McDonald was put on the stand by Chambers' attor-
ney after the State failed to call him, but was only partially successful in presenting the
desired testimony to the jury. One obstacle was Mississippi's "voucher rule," which pre-
sumes that a party calling a witness vouches for his credibility and is thereby bound by
anything the witness might say. The other was the fact that Mississippi did not recognize
declarations against penal interests and thus the testimony of three witnesses to whom
McDonald had confessed prior to his sworn confession were inadmissible under the hear-
say rule.
In sum, then, this was Chambers' predicament. As a consequence of the combi-
nation of Mississippi's "party witness" or "voucher" rule and its hearsay rule,
he was unable either to cross-examine McDonald or to present witnesses in his
own behalf who would have discredited McDonald's repudiation and demon-
strated his complicity. Chambers had, however, chipped away at the fringes of
McDonald's story by introducing admissible testimony from other sources...
[but] Chambers' defense was far less persuasive than it might have been had
he been given an opportunity to subject McDonald's statements to cross-
examination or had the other confessions been admitted.
410 U.S. at 294.
64. Id. at 295.
65. Although the Supreme Court grounded its reversal on the denial of cross-
examination and the exclusion of McDonald's admissions, it appears that some lower
courts have concluded that either violation alone justifies reversal. See the discussion and
cases cited in Note, Constitutional Restraints on the Exclusion of Evidence in the Defen-
dant's Favor: The Implication of Davis v. Alaska, 73 MICH. L. Rav. 1465, 1485-86 n. 95
(1975).
66. Some lower courts have regarded Chambers as not intending to establish any new
broad principle of constitutional law regarding a state's "voucher" or other evidentiary
rules and have thus limited the case somewhat to its particular facts and circumstances.
E.g., United States v. Hughes, 529 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1976); Herrin v. State, 230 Ga. 476,
197 S.E.2d 734 (1973). Other courts however have found it to be authority to circumvent
strict application of state evidentiary rules where the evidence bears assurances of
trustworthiness and appears critical to the outcome. E.g., Johnson v. Brewer, 521 F.2d
556 (8th Cir. 1975); Salem v. State of North Carolina, 374 F. Supp. 1281 (1974); Kreisher
v. State, 303 A.2d 651 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1974); State v. Jamison, 64 N.J. 363, 316 A.2d 439
(1974); State v. Carrillo, 88 N.M. 236, 539 P.2d 626 (1975).
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different courts it would seem to be persuasive authority for at-
tacking a strict, mechanical application of section 26-7.2, at least
where the proffered testimony bears assurances of trustworthi-
ness and appears critical to the outcome."7 The application of
that section would prohibit without exception an impeachment
cross-examination which centers upon a non-receipted written
statement, regardless of the resulting prejudice to the defend-
ant's right of confrontation. Such a construction simply could not
pass constitutional muster after Chambers."
It is possible then that the Motes court, by concluding that
there was no prejudice caused by the exclusion of the prior writ-
ten statement, was not completely oblivious to its contradictory
ruling which construed the statute strictly. Rather it was conceiv-
ably attempting to frame its opinion so as not to foreclose any
avenue it might want to take when actually faced with the consti-
tutional issue. Unfortunately when given this opportunity in the
recent case of State v. Bolten,15 the court merely affirmed, with-
out discussion, the decision in Motes.70 Although the court could
have moved in several directions which would have obviated the
constitutional issue or at least clarified the grounds of the Motes
decision, the court failed to do either, thus perpetuating the con-
fusion concerning the proper construction to be given the statute.
67. 410 U.S. at 302. With regard to the requirement that the excluded testimony be
critical, one commentator observed:
Certainly, the [Chambers decision] is not based on the fact that the eviden-
tiary rulings "interfered with" the defendant's case, or rendered it "far less
persuasive than it might have been." For this is the inevitable effect of any
evidentiary ruling on the party against whom the rule is invoked. It is more
likely that the key factor is the nature of the testimony at issue. Undoubtably,
it was critical to Chambers' defense.
Recent Decisions, 62 ILL. B.J. 158, 159 (1973) (footnotes omitted).
68. See also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) where the Supreme Court found that
a statute prohibiting the admission of juvenile records which operated to prevent an
effective cross-examination of a crucial governmental witness for possible bias, violated
the defendant's right of confrontation.
One commentator astutely observed of the decision's reach that,
[wihile it is not the first case holding that the right of confrontation guarantees
more than a trial procedure allowing physical confrontation and some cross-
examination, it is the first to base a determination that the right of confronta-
tion was violated on an explicit examination of the effectiveness of a line of
cross-examination.
Note, Constitutional Restraints on the Exclusion of Evidence in the Defendant's Favor:
The Implications of Davis v. Alaska, 73 MIH. L. REv. 1465, 1465-66 (1975) (emphasis in
original; footnotes omitted); see 415 U.S. at 318.
69. 266 S.C. 444, 223 S.E.2d 863 (1976).
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The most direct course the court could have taken would
have been to construe sections 1-65, 26-7.1 and 26-7.2 as applica-
ble only to proscribe the use of unreceipted written statements
by the state. Conceding that the import of the language employed
conveys just the opposite legislative intent,7' prior judicial inter-
pretations of those sections have indicated that they should be
read not literally, but in a manner which best effectuates the
legislative purpose. 2 It is clear that this part of the Code was
merely intended to remedy the common law disability of a defen-
dant to discover his own written statement.73 The broad language
was therefore provided to ensure that all those possibly involved
in securing a written statement, especially a written confession,
would be included under the statute's scope. The pertinent sec-
tions, then, should not be construed to deprive the defendant of
the benefit of any evidence contained in the unreceipted state-
ments because of the failure of the state to comply with the law
since the intent was to protect not hinder the defendant.
An alternative construction the supreme court might have
advanced would have been to deny the statute's applicability in
criminal cases where it is apparent that prejudice or a serious
injustice would result to the defendant. Notably, since the Motes
opinion is already partially couched in language dealing with
prejudice, it would have been a simple matter for the court to
formally adopt the standards enunciated in Chambers."
The effect of the South Carolina Supreme Court's affirmance
in Motes and its failure to explore the constitutional problems
raised by Chambers is to foreclose such alternatives to the federal
courts. Since the Federal District Court must defer to the state
court on questions of state statutory interpretation, 75 that court
will be required to rule all of the provisions of sections 26-7.1, and
26-7.2 unconstitutional as applied if Chambers is later found con-
trolling.
71. See note 51 supra.
72. See note 52 supra.
73. This common law disability is examined in its present context in Fletcher,
Pretrial Discovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1960); Goldstein, The
State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149,
1180-85 (1960); Kaufman, Criminal Discovery and Inspection of Defendant's Own State.
ments in the Federal Courts, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 1113 (1957). See generally 6 WIGMORE §§
1850, 1859(g) (Chadbourn rev. 1976).
74. See notes 62-65 and accompanying text supra.
75. For an excellent examination of this point, see Tushnet, Constitutional Limita-
tion of Substantive Criminal Law: An Examination of the Meaning of Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 55 BOSTON U.L. REV. 775, 786 n. 78 (1975).
[Vol. 28
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It might be noted however that Chambers may possibly
apply only where the statements precluded under the statute are
critical to the defense." Thus it is arguable that in most instances
the preclusion of a written statement under the rule would have
such a negligible effect on the outcome of the case, that an issue
of any significant constitutional dimension would not be raised
except in "rare" circumstances. Even so, the South Carolina
Supreme Court could have immunized the statute by specifically
adopting the prejudice standard enunciated in Chambers. Its fail-
ure to do so leaves the statute vulnerable to constitutional invali-
dation and subject to considerable conjecture as to the statute's
proper function.
IV. PRIVILEGED SPOUSAL COMMUNICATION
Another aspect of the decision in State v. Motes" requires
careful attention. The supreme court, over the strong dissent of
Justice Bussey, held that the effect of section 26-403 of the 1962
Code of Laws is to grant solely to the witnessing spouse the right
to exercise the privilege against disclosing marital communica-
tions.78 In this particular case, the State was permitted to call the
wife of the defendant, over his objection, as a voluntary witness
against him.
Although South Carolina originally recognized the common
law rule that neither spouse was competent to testify for or
against the other in a lawsuit, the competency of a husband or
wife as a witness is now determined in this state under the follow-
ing provisions of section 26-403 of the 1962 Code of Laws:
In any trial or inquiry in any suit, action or proceeding in any
court . . . the husband or wife of any party thereto or of any
person in whose behalf any suit, action or proceeding is brought,
prosecuted, opposed or defended shall, except as hereinafter
stated, be competent and compellable to give evidence, the
same as any other witness, on behalf of any party to such suit,
action or proceeding. But no husband or wife shall be required
to disclose any confidential or, in a criminal proceeding, any
communication made by one to the other during their mar-
riage. 9
76. See note 67 supra.
77. 264 S.C. 317, 215 S.E.2d 190 (1975).
78. Id. at 324, 215 S.E.2d at 193.
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The language of the statute removes the common law disability
which formerly attended spousal testimony. It further purports to
make such testimony compellable, whether favorable or adverse
to the author-spouse. The statute then deals disjunctively with
the separate questions of interspousal testimony" by protecting
confidential communications from disclosure in civil cases, and
all communications made by one spouse to the other during their
marriage in criminal proceedings.8 '
a provision enacted in 1866, making the husband and wife competent and compellable to
testify for or against each other in civil cases. The history of this provision, as it emerged
in various forms throughout numerous codifications, is succinctly described in Comment,
Witnesses- Competency of Spouses to Testify Against Each Other in Criminal
Trial-Compelling the Spouse to Testify, 16 S.C.L. REV. 615, 620-23 (1964).
For treatment of the early common law rule of spousal incompetency, see MCCORMICK
§ 66; 2 WIGMORE §§ 600-20A; Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of
Evidence: Family Relations, 13 MINN. L. REV. 675 (1929); Note, A Critical Examination
of Some Evidentiary Privileges: A Symposium, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 206 (1961); Note,
Competency of One Spouse to Testify Against the Other in Criminal Cases Where the
Testimony Does Not Relate to Confidential Communications: Modern Trend, 38 VA. L.
REV. 359 (1952).
80. The distinction between rules of incompetency and rules of privilege should be
kept in view. Rules of incompetency are designed to aid in the search for truth, disqualify-
ing certain witnesses as unreliable for various reasons, while a privilege operates to shut
out evidence, thus obstructing the search for truth. A privilege is accorded to protect a
person or interest for reasons of public policy. Care must therefore be taken to make this
distinction, since courts have used the term "incompetency" to refer indiscriminately to
both rules of exclusion. E.g., Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 75 (1958). Perhaps
in reaction to this misuse of the terms, the authorities have set out a great deal of detail
to distinguish the two types of rules. See MCCORMICK § 78; 8 WIGMORE §§ 2332-34
(McNaughton rev. 1962).
Succinctly stated, the privilege of marital communication at common law prohibits
testimony by a spouse concerning intra-spousal confidential communications made during
marriage. The privilege obtains even though the parties were at the time estranged and,
moreover, survives the death of a spouse or their divorce. The essence of the privilege is
to protect confidences intended to be private and, thus, all communications or disclosive
acts made in private are presumed to be confidential. Nevertheless, a third party who
overhears a marital confidence may disclose it, unless his eavesdropping was made possi-
ble by the connivance of the other spouse. Lastly, it should be noted that the privilege is
generally regarded as inapplicable (1) when one spouse is being prosecuted for a crime
against the other, (2) when a third party is being sued for an injury to the marriage status,
or (3) when one spouse sues for divorce and the quoted matter is a threat of harm or a
confession of marital transgression. See generally DREHER 26-27; MCCORMICK §§ 78-86; 8
WIGMORE §§ 2332-41 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Hutchins and Slesinger, Some Observa-
tions on the Law of Evidence: Family Relations, 13 MINN. L. REv. 675,680-82 (1929); Note,
Spousal Testimony, 28 BROOKLYN L. REV. 259, 268-92 (1962); Note, A Critical Examina-
tion of Some Evidentiary Privileges: A Symposium, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 206, 216-30 (1961);
Note, Competency of One Spouse to Testify Against the Other in Criminal Cases Where
the Testimony Does Not Relate to Confidential Communications: Modern Trends, 38 VA.
L. REV. 359 (1952).
81. This statutory distinction between disclosures in criminal cases and those in civil
18
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The statute, until the Motes decision, had always been re-
garded as preserving, by necessary inference, the author-spouse's
right to claim the privilege against the disclosure of marital com-
munications.12 The court, however, viewed the statute as
"defin[ing] the limits of the remaining privilege against being
compelled to so testify." 3 As such, the court gave it the following
literal reading:
In view of the prior removal of the disqualification of the hus-
band and wife as witnesses against each other and the injunc-
tion that they may be "compellable" to give evidence as any
other witness, the subsequent limitation that "no husband or
wife" could be required to disclose marital communications
means that the privilege against disclosing such evidence must
be claimed or asserted, otherwise the disclosure could be re-
quired. There is no statutory language to indicate a legislative
intent that a witness spouse could not so testify unless the other
spouse agreed. It is the particular witness (husband or wife, as
the case may be) who cannot be compelled to disclose; and, in
the absence of a contrary statutory direction, the right to exer-
cise the privilege against disclosing marital communications is
solely that of the witness spouse from whom the privileged infor-
mation is being sought.84
It should be observed that the majority's position is singular
in finding the holder of the privilege to be the witnessing spouse."
cases was thought by Professor Dreher ". . . to add little to the common law rule...
because all communications made in private betwzen a husband and wife are presumed
to be confidential unless the subject matter or the circumstances show to the contrary."
DREHER 26 (footnote omitted).
82. DREHER 26-27; Whaley, Handbook on South Carolina Evidence, 9 S.C.L.Q. (4A)
31 (1957).
83. 264 S.C. at 323, 215 S.E.2d at 192.
84. Id. at 323-24, 215 S.E.2d at 192-93.
85. The prevailing view as characterized by Professor Wigmore:
The privilege is intended to secure freedom from apprehension in the mind of
the one desiring to communicate; it thus belongs to the communicating one. The
other one-the addressee of the communication-is therefore not entitled to
object unless ... the latter's silence is treated as an assent and an adoption of
the statement, which thus makes it doubly a communication and doubly privi-
leged.
8 WIGMORE § 2340 (McNaughton rev. 1961), (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original). For
collected cases see id. at nn. 1 & 2; accord, DREHER 27; MCCORMICK § 83; cf., People v.
Wood, 126 N.Y. 249, 271, 27 N.E. 362, 368 (1891); Whaley, Handbook on South Carolina
Evidence, 9 S.C.L.Q. (4A) 31 (1957) (that a waiver must be by both spouses since it is
the privilege of both).
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That is not to say the opinion is erroneous for that reason. Indeed,
the court fashioned its literal reading on the premise that since
the effect of the statute was in derogation of the common law
privilege, the court should look solely to the statute, not to the
weight of common law authority, to determine the conditions
under which the privilege might be asserted."s It is precisely this
premise, that the statute acts in derogation of the common law
privilege, which Justice Bussey persuasively argues to be erro-
neous. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Bussey thoroughly traces
the legislative history and the subsequent judicial constructions
of prior statutory enactments of the privilege and ultimately
concludes,
that it was the intent of the legislature to preserve the privilege
of communications between husband and wife, which privilege
was preserved primarily for the benefit of the communicating
spouse, but also for either spouse who chose to claim it and not
the privilege is sometimes accorded to both, and sometimes to the communica-
tor .... [To accord the privilege to the communicatee only would have the
effect of leaving the communicator, the party most likely to be prejudiced by
the testimony, without the protection of the privilege and such an approach
clearly contravenes the policies of the privilege. (footnotes omitted)
Note, A Critical Examination of Some Evidentiary Privileges: A Symposium, 56 Nw. U.L.
REV. 206, 220 (1961).
The North Carolina Supreme Court defined the ownership of the privilege under a
statute similar to that of South Carolina. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-56 (1969) provides: "No
husband or wife shall be compellable to disclose any confidential communication made
by the one to the other during their marriage." Prior to Hagedorn v. Hagedorn, 211 N.C.
175, 189 S.E. 507 (1937), it was assumed, in accordance with the prevailing rule, that in
North Carolina both spouses were protected, not only from being compelled to disclose a
communication made in confidence between them, but also, from disclosure by or through
the connivance of the other. D. STANSWURY, NoaTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 60 (2d ed. 1963).
In the Hagedorn case, however, it was held with little discussion and without citation of
supporting authority that the privilege was that of the witness only; that if one spouse
chose to testify to a confidential communication, the other could not successfully object.
The decision was criticized in Note, Evidence-Privileged Communications Between Hus-
band and Wife, 15 N.C.L. REV. 282 (1937): "Thus, under this decision, where one spouse
confides in the other, apparently both spouses are given a privilege not to disclose the
confidences, but either can waive it for both." Id. at 285 (emphasis in original). Subse-
quently, the North Carolina Supreme Court was given the opportunity to reconsider this
ruling in the case of Hicks v. Hicks, 271 N.C. 204, 155 S.E.2d 799 (1967). The court,
however, declined to expressly overrule Hagedorn and held instead that "[i]f Hagedorn
is applicable here under the factual situation, we are not inclined to follow it. . ." 271
N.C. at 207, 155 S.E.2d at 802. The logical conclusion to be drawn from the case, according
to one writer, is that "the rule in North Carolina is that both spouses have the privilege
but neither can waive it without the consent of the other." Note, Evidence-Privileged
Communications Between Husband and Wife, 46 N.C.L. REV. 643, 651 (1968).
86. 264 S.C. at 323, 215 S.E.2d at 192.
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merely for a spouse who perchance chose to be or not to be a
witness thereabout.
87
If an explanation of the majority's opinion exists, it would
appear to be that the court was not made aware of the pervasive
consequences of deciding the case on such unsturdy grounds. In
the first place, neither of the parties before the court addressed
the issue as to the holder of the privilege but focused, instead,
on questions relating to the requisite confidentiality and the
scope of the communications." Perhaps the court was merely
attempting to escape the almost metaphysical maze such a dis-
cussion would be likely to entail. Nevertheless, in deciding the
case as it did, the court has effectively read out of existence a
large part of the rule of privileged spousal communication in
South Carolina. Under the Motes decision, the communicating
spouse can only be assured that his spouse will not be compelled
to disclose such confidences in open court.
89
87. Id. at 330, 215 S.E.2d at 195; see note 6 supra.
88. In states with similar statutes, rather than substantially abolishing the privilege
altogether, courts tend to limit the statutes' destructive nature by finding such communi-
cations are not strictly confidential. See, e.g., People v. Melski, 10 N.Y.2d 78, 176 N.E.2d
81, 217 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1961). In that case the defendant and accomplices stole a number of
guns. The group, upon being discovered by the defendant's wife in their home, subse-
quently related to her the nature of the crime. The majority held that the communication
in question was neither induced by the marital relation nor made in confidence, as evi-
denced by the presence of third parties. See Note, Evidence-Husband and Wife-
Confidential Communication, 11 Ai. U.L. REv. 106 (1962); Note, Witnesses-Compe-
tency-Acts of Husband and Wife as Privileged Communications, 38 N.D.L. REV. 133
(1962).
However, careful attention to the distinctive language employed in the South Caro-
lina statute raises the question of whether such a tactic is available to the court in this
jurisdiction. In contrast to most other state statutes, the South Carolina Code distin-
guishes between disclosures in civil cases and those in criminal prosecutions. It apparently
creates a privilege for any communication between spouses in a criminal proceeding, as
opposed to confidential communications which are privileged in either type of proceeding
at common law. Notwithstanding Professor Dreher's observation that such a distinction
"would seem to add little to the common law rule," the scope of the privilege as extended
by § 26-403 for criminal proceedings literally deletes any requirement of confidentiality
whatsoever, thereby eliminating the avenue employed by other jurisdictions to save the
heart of the privilege.
Another approach often taken to limit the evidentiary obstruction of the privilege is
for the court to narrowly define "communications." See McCoRMIcK § 79 and cases col-
lected at 164 n. 19. But it should be noted that an equal number of courts have construed
their statutes to extend the privilege to acts, facts, conditions and transactions not
amounting to expressive communications at all. Cases collected in MCCORMICK § 79, at
164 n. 20.
89. It is debatable whether limiting the privilege as such, is "good" or "bad." For a
view that a limited rule is to be preferred, see Note, Competency of One Spouse to Testify
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If the privilege is intended, as the authorities contend,"0 to
secure freedom from apprehension in the mind of one desiring to
communicate, then it cannot be gainsaid that the benefit of the
privilege is substantially lost after the Motes decision. Moreover,
this particular resolution concerning the exercise of the marital
privilege suggests one further flaw compounding the others - i.e.,
determining whether the in-court disclosure by the witnessing
spouse is actually voluntarily made. The essence of the argument
to be advanced is that there are often ways "to compel such
testimony more subtle than the simple issuance of a subpoena,
but just as cogent."'" This line of argument would be most per-
suasive in those instances where the testifying spouse had
played more than a passive part in the offense, or where the
decision to testify closely followed an investigation by the author-
ities. In this light one more expected problem attending the
Motes decision will remain in defining exactly what is voluntary
spousal testimony.
Whether the witness privilege rule will prove beneficial in
Against the Other in Criminal Cases Where the Testimony Does Not Relate to Confiden-
tial Communications: Modem Trend, 38 VA. L. REV. 359, 374 (1952). For the view recog-
nizing the merits of the broader exclusion see Note, A Critical Examination of Some
Evidentiary Privileges: A Symposium, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 206, 218 (1961).
The most basic policy justification supporting the retention of the privilege has been
to help preserve marital harmony. Critics of the privilege are quick to point out that the
rule is applied regardless of whether a particular marriage is preservable. Indeed, family
harmony is nearly always past preserving when one spouse is willing to aid in the prosecu-
tion of the other. MCcoRMicK § 66. Secondly, the privilege is widely accepted due to
society's natural repugnance to requiring one spouse to testify against the other by disclos-
ing marital communications. Note, A Critical Examination of Some Evidentiary Privi-
leges: A Symposium, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 206, 218 (1961). But even the limited privilege
left by Motes does not require one spouse to testify against the other.
90. See note 85 supra.
91. The language is that of Justice Stewart, concurring in Hawkins v. United States,
358 U.S. 74, 83 (1958). The defendant in that case was convicted of violating the Mann
Act by transporting a girl across state lines for immoral purposes. His wife was permitted
to testify against him over his objection. The court, under its rule-making authority, held
that although the wife did not object to testifying, admission of her testimony over the
defendant's objection was error.
The government had argued, analogous to the Motes holding, that the privilege
should be that of the witness and, though she could not be compelled to testify, neither
could she be prevented from doing so by the defendant-spouse. Justice Stewart, however,
observed that the circumstances of the case were hardly consistent with the theory that
her testimony was indeed voluntary. It appears that before the wife testified, she had been
incarcerated as a material witness, her bonded release being conditioned upon her appear-
ance in court as a witness for the government. Id. at 83. Justice Stewart went on to note
that in general "such a (witness privilegel rule would be difficult to administer and easy
to abuse." Id.
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terms of facilitating the truth-finding function of a trial, or
whether any such benefits will be viewed as insignificant in com-
parison with the loss of the traditional notions of interspousal
privilege, can be ascertained only with the passage of time. But
certainly it is to be observed that a judicial change of any privi-
lege accorded to protect a person or interest for reasons of public
policy, is characteristically made with more caution and gener-
ally upon a more explicit legislative intent than the bolder
interpretation of the old privilege found necessary by the South
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